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Virginia Sanchini1,2, Cecilia Nardini1,2 and Giovanni Boniolo1,2*End-of-life decisions are often associated with the per-
spective of the respiratory specialist. On one side, the
physician may be confronted directly with these deci-
sions regarding their own patients with an end-stage
respiratory failure caused by a chronic conditions such
as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). On
the other hand, several degenerative pathologies – such
as degenerative neuromuscular conditions – require at
some point the resort to the respiratory unit, oftentimes
while the patient is still fully competent.
In 2007 Nava et al. [1] surveyed for the European Re-
spiratory Society the situation of end-of-life decision-
making in respiratory intermediate care units across
Europe, and they found that “an end-of-life decision is
taken for 21.5% of patients admitted” [1]. The number
speaks for the relevance of the issue not only for critical
care specialists but for all respiratory physicians. A fur-
ther aspect to be considered is the unpredictable evolu-
tion of chronic respiratory conditions as compared to
other diseases requiring end-of-life care. For tumour pa-
tients, it is generally possible to predict with accuracy
the moment when a life-sustaining intervention will be
needed. On the other hand, for respiratory ailments, it is
difficult to predict the onset of a terminal respiratory
failure. This potentially creates controversial situations
where assisted ventilation is put in place to manage an
acute event, but then has to be maintained and becomes
a life-sustaining intervention in all respects. Managing
situations like the one described is particularly complex
for two main reasons. As a first thing, the fact that ter-
minal stages of respiratory conditions have such blurred
boundaries as opposed to other diseases such as cancer
means that the physician may fail to recognise that he
is dealing with a situation where an end-of-life decision
is being taken. In case he does, though, the difficulty re-
mains nonetheless, since we generally maintain that* Correspondence: giovanni.boniolo@ieo.eu
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holding” – i.e. not initiating – a life-sustaining interven-
tion if the patient so wishes, and “withdrawing” the
same treatment once it has been instated, even if the
treatment is unwanted.
The distinction between “withholding” and “withdraw-
ing” a life-sustaining medical treatment does, in fact,
represent one of the most controversial issues in the
end-of-life bioethical debate.
Before entering this debate, one should be mindful of
the need to clarify the term “euthanasia”. Euthanasia gen-
erally means any action or omission that by itself or in its
intentions leads to the death of the patient, in order to
prevent his/her further suffering. This definition warrants
further specification, i.e. that euthanasia is only a general
expression to cover several different practices, further spe-
cified through the adjectives that are associated with this
word: active and passive euthanasia; voluntary, non-
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia; direct and indirect
euthanasia.
The categories of withholding and withdrawing a treat-
ment deal with the ones of active and passive euthanasia.
Indeed, most bioethicists appear willing to define with-
drawing a treatment as a form of “active” euthanasia (to
perform an act that by itself causes the death of the pa-
tient), and withholding a treatment as a form of “passive”
euthanasia (not to administer a lifesaving medical treat-
ment, as a consequence of which the patient dies)a. As far
as the ethical point of view is concerned, the relevant
question does not really deal with the investigation of the
two actions per se, but with the question of whether with-
holding and withdrawing a treatment are morally equiva-
lent due to the same effect they cause. Providing an
answer to this question means first and foremost address-
ing another question, that is whether “action” (in this case
interrupting a process already started) and “omission” (in
this case refraining from starting a process) might be con-
sidered equivalent from a moral point of view [2]. In order
to remove any doubt, it would be useful to point out
that this question is not concerned with definitivelyl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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and/or withdraw a lifesaving medical treatment to a dying
patient. Instead, it establishes that if withholding and with-
drawing (hence if action and omission) are morally equiva-
lent, then either both of them are ethically allowed or both
of them are ethically disallowed. The different ways in
which bioethicists have answered this central question are
only tangentially related to the better-known threads of
the debate about euthanasia and assisted suicide (generally
expressed as follows: “sanctity” of life vs. “quality” of life).
The traditional answer to this issue might be presented
through a statement declared by the House of Delegates
of the American Medical Association on December 4,
1973:
“The intentional termination of the life of one human
being by another – mercy killing – is contrary to that
for which the medical profession stands and is
contrary to the policy of the American Medical
Association. The cessation of the employment of
extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body
when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death
is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or his
immediate family. The advice and judgment of the
physician should be freely available to the patient
and/or his immediate family”.
According to this statement, therefore, while active
euthanasia should be condemned both legally and mor-
ally, passive euthanasia might be, under some precise
and circumstantial conditions, accepted. The main rea-
sons lying behind such a choice seem to deal with the
concept of “causality”. In the active euthanasia case, the
physician is directly causing the patient’s death, whereas
in the passive euthanasia case it is the terminal disease
that eventually leads to the death of the patients. Could
the same reasoning hold in the case of the withholding/
withdrawing distinction as well? For instance, it might
be argued that in the withdrawing scenario the physician
interrupting the treatment is the direct cause of the pa-
tient’s death, whereas in the withholding case the phys-
ician does nothing to causally contribute to it.
That the causality argument is not a decisive reason to
support a distinction also at the moral level between
withholding and withdrawing a lifesaving medical treat-
ment is what has been argued by some upstream bioeth-
icists. James Rachels, for example, explores the ethical
boundaries of the distinctions by means of a mental ex-
periment now famous in bioethical literature. Rachels
imagines two different scenarios: “In the first, Smith
stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should hap-
pen to his six-year-old cousin. One evening while the
child is taking his bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom
and drowns the child, and then arranges things so that itwill look like an accident. In the second, Jones also
stands to gain if anything should happen to his six-year-
old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to
drown the child. However, just as he enters the bath-
room Jones sees the child slip and hit his head, and fall
face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands by,
ready to push the child’s head back under if it is neces-
sary, but it is not necessary. With only a little thrashing
about, the child drowns all by himself, “accidentally,” as
Jones watches and does nothing” [3]. Rachels claims that
when we examine two cases in which the results are the
same and the motives (personal gains) are the same, the
simple reason that there is a “factual” difference between
killing and letting die does not provide any robust justifi-
cation in favour of a “moral” difference between the two.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the dis-
tinction between withholding and withdrawing of a life-
sustaining treatment is far more complex than a simple
dichotomy, and that its ethical ramification has profound
consequences for end-of-life decisions in the clinical
practice. We trust therefore that the readers of Multidis-
ciplinary Respiratory Medicine (MRM) will be interested
in the series of papers that a selected group of authors
(Jos Weile, Henk ten Have, Massimo Reichlin, Michael
Barilain e Patrizia Borsellino) have contributed to this
Journal in a comprehensive exploration of the state-of-
the-art on this ethical issue.
The contribution of Jos Weile and Henk ten Have The
Ethics of Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment – Theoretical
Considerations might be considered a first step in this
direction. They provocatively argue that the default op-
tion in the end-of-life context does not rest in curing the
patient but in following almost always the imperative of
“do not treat”. Indeed, two main conditions should be
met, according to them, before physicians and health
care professionals in general are morally permitted to
provide a treatment. Firstly, the treatment must be
medically indicated, that is such a treatment “is likely
to benefit the patient and not cause disproportionate
harm”. Secondly, the patient “must be informed about
his diagnosis, prognosis, and the nature of the treatment
X, and must consent to it”. Hence, following their rea-
soning, not only action and omission have two different
moral weights, but omitting a treatment is nearly always
a better option from an ethical point of view than pro-
viding the patient with a treatment, because the admin-
istration of any treatment is bound to the fulfillment of
the above-mentioned conditions.
The belief that it is not always necessary to impose on
the patient lifesaving medical treatments constitutes a
shared idea among the contributors to this debate in our
Journal. In addition to the paper presented in this issue
of MRM, three more articles on the debate are going to
appear in a subsequent issue. The authors analyse the
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spectives and areas of expertise, but they all share the same
underlying ethical belief of “not imposing on the patient
unwanted treatments”. Massimo Reichlin in On the ethics
of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment investi-
gates precisely this concept. After having argued in favour
of the moral irrelevance of the distinction between with-
holding and withdrawing and of the ethical legitimacy of
the patient’s choice over both these options, he clarifies that
this idea does not necessarily imply the ethical legitimacy of
a form of voluntary active euthanasia. Indeed, whether the
latter is bound to the acceptance of a robust positive right,
ascribable to the patient, to decide when to terminate their
life (which should confer, at the same time, a right to the
physician to kill this patient), the rationale underlying with-
holding or withdrawing a treatment is completely different.
Through the author’s words, it is “a moral principle accord-
ing to which the patient has a right to decide the therapies
he is willing to accept and those he does not want”.
Rephrased in this way, the debate should be rethought in
the light of two considerations. On the one hand, we might
argue that it is the conditions in which action and omission
take place that makes a moral difference rather than action
and omission as such. On the other hand, also omission
should be rethought, since “What justifies this decision is
not the physician’s doing nothing, but the fact that the pa-
tient and the physician are agreed that the benefits to be
gained by insisting on the treatment do not justify the bur-
dens that it imposes on the patient, considering his situ-
ation and quality of life”.
The last two papers distance themselves from the per-
spective considered so far. Despite maintaining the same
ethical imperative of not imposing on the patient unwanted
and potentially harmful treatments, they address such a
topic either from a sociological or from a legal perspective.
In Rethinking the withholding/withdrawing distinction:
the cultural construction of “life support” and framing of
the end-of-life decisions, Y.M. Barilan, through the case of
the Israeli 2005 Law on patient nearing death and its latest
developments, shows how traditional distinctions framing
bioethical debate over the end-of-life focus on technical
aspects of human action and that these distinctions might
be completely reversed by introducing some devices to,
for examples, machines for artificial ventilation. Because
of that, this article interestingly proposes to reframe the
classical bioethical distinction at stake into broader histor-
ical, psychological and regulatory context. In particular,
through the analysis of two hypothetical case scenarios
and the above-mentioned Israeli law, Barilan shows how
the law exercises its regulatory power far beyond the cases
it is supposed to regulate, thus suggesting that technology
and social values are thoroughly entwined.
Finally, in Limitation of the therapeutic effort: ethical and
legal justification for withholding and/or withdrawing lifesustaining treatments, Patrizia Borsellino identifies with-
holding and withdrawing as two forms of limitation of the
therapeutic efforts and upstream argues that there are cri-
teria “both in medical ethics in the law often adequate
enough to remove doubts, and to guide decisions and ac-
tions”. Indeed, first of all, she claims that provided that we
are in the case of a competent patient, “the current legal-
ethical frameworks subordinate all medical interventions to
the patient’s will”. Instead, in the case of patient lacking de-
cision capacity, most European and non-European coun-
tries envisage the appeal to the so-called living will or the
reference to a substitute person to make their health care
decisions and to participate in the decision-making process.
Assistance to end-of-life decision-making is, and will
probably remain, a troublesome area for the respiratory
physician, also due to the fact that the literature is most
often dealing with the situation of acute patients admitted
to the respiratory unit, rather than of chronic respiratory
patients facing end-stage respiratory failure. We believe that
exploring the distinction between withholding and with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment represents a valuable ef-
fort towards bringing the ethical discourse closer to the
practice of the physician in general and of the pulmonary
specialist in particular. The series of papers we collected ad-
dress this topic from different perspectives (ethical, legal,
sociological) and, by thoroughly investigating this distinc-
tion, they are able to clarify a debate in which the boundar-
ies between “the rationally consistent” and “the personal
arbitrariness” are not always so easy to be established.
Endnotes
aActually, some bioethicists would disagree with such
an analogy. Indeed, some philosophers think that by pas-
sive euthanasia we should consider the interruption of a
medical treatment still useful for patient’s life, whereas
in the case of both withholding and withdrawing we deal
with a medical treatment useless and disproportionate
for the patient’s life.
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